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Abstract—The large scale integration of stochastic renewable
energy introduces significant challenges for power system opera-
tors and disputes the efficiency of the current market design.
Recent research embeds the uncertain nature of renewable
sources by modelling electricity markets as a two-stage stochastic
problem, co-optimizing day-ahead and real-time dispatch. In this
framework, we introduce a bilevel model to derive the optimal
bid of a strategic wind power producer acting as price-maker
both in day-ahead and real-time stages. The proposed model is a
Mathematical Program with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)
that is reformulated as a single-level Mixed-Integer Linear
Program (MILP), which can be readily solved. Our analysis
shows that adopting strategic behaviour may improve producer’s
expected profit as the share of wind power increases. However,
this incentive diminishes in power systems where available flexible
capacity is high enough to ensure an efficient market operation.
Index Terms—Electricity markets, mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC), price-maker, stochastic pro-
gramming, wind power.
NOMENCLATURE
Sets
I Set of indices of dispatchable units i.
W Set of indices of wind power units w.
K Set of indices of wind power scenarios k.
J Set of indices of bid discretization blocks j.
Parameters
D System demand [MW].
Ci Day-ahead offer price of unit i [$/MWh].
C+i , C
−
i Up/down regulation offer price of unit i [$/MWh].
Csh Value of involuntarily shed load [$/MWh].
Pmaxi , P
cap
w Capacity of units i and w [MW].
Pmini Minimum generation of unit i [MW].
P ∗wk Wind power realization in scenario k [MW].
R+i , R
−
i Maximum up/down reserve offered by unit i [MW].
Variables
pbidw Bidding quantity of unit w [MW].
pi, pw Day-ahead dispatch of units i and w [MW].
r+ik, r
−
ik Up/down regulation by unit i in scenario k [MW].
pspillwk Wind power spilled by unit w in scenario k [MW].
lshk Load shedding in scenario k [MW].
I. INTRODUCTION
The current setup of the European electricity market is based
on sequential clearing of two main trading floors. The day-
ahead (forward) market is cleared 12-36 hours before actual
operation based on the expected values of uncertain parame-
ters, e.g., wind power production. To maintain system balance
during real-time operation, any deviations from the day-ahead
dispatch are compensated by the activation of reserves in the
balancing market. This market architecture was considered
adequate to cope with the limited and discrete uncertainty
arising from load deviations and equipment contingencies,
respectively. However, such market designs are challenged as
the share of non-dispatchable and partly predictable renew-
ables increases in the power system. To cope effectively with
this uncertainty, system operators and wind power producers
have to consider novel market designs and trading strategies to
mitigate their exposure to increased system costs and financial
losses induced by the deployment of expensive reserves.
To this end, we follow recent research focusing on market
setups which jointly optimize day-ahead dispatch and real-
time reserve deployment in a single settlement energy-only
market [1], [2]. Having a probabilistic description of system
uncertainties in form of scenarios, the market-clearing model
is formulated as a two-stage stochastic programming problem
where the first stage represents the day-ahead schedule and
the second stage represents the real-time dispatch, i.e., the
decisions which can be modified once uncertainty is revealed.
As opposed to existing market designs which do not allow
for any inter-temporal arbitrage to deal with uncertainty, the
stochastic market-clearing can pre-position available genera-
tion according to its technical and economic characteristics to
secure adequate flexible capacity during real-time operation.
A direct consequence of this advanced market architecture is
that support mechanisms (e.g., feed-in tariffs, exemption from
imbalance costs) aimed to safeguard wind power producers
against the volatility of electricity prices may become obsolete.
Such mechanisms are gradually removed as this generation
technology reaches grid parity, enforcing wind power produc-
ers to trade their production in electricity markets according to
the same rules that apply to conventional generators. Hence,
a strategic wind power producer may consider minimizing its
exposure to the risk associated with forecast uncertainty by
accounting for its potential recourse actions. Relevant literature
[3], [4] has focused on optimal bidding strategies under the
assumption of a price-taker wind power producer. However,
the soundness of this argument diminishes in areas where wind
power has a dominant position in the market [5], which allows
it to act as a price-maker. In that vein, recent works modelled
the participation of a price-maker wind power producer either
in forward [6] or in real-time [7] markets.
To our knowledge, this research is the first to study a price-
maker wind power producer’s optimal bid in a co-optimized
day-ahead and real-time market cleared using stochastic pro-
gramming. We contribute to the state-of-the-art by considering
the impact of a wind power producer’s strategic behaviour
simultaneously on both market settlements as opposed to
previous studies. We develop a methodological framework to
derive the optimal bid of a price-maker wind power producer
based on a stochastic bilevel model. Applying the proposed
method on a case study, we show that as wind power stakes
increase, a wind power producer expects to increase its profit
by strategic bidding. On the contrary, as the flexible capacity
offered by dispatchable generator increases, the wind power
producer derives no additional gains through strategic bidding.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section
II we discuss the setup of the problem while in Section III
we introduce the mathematical formulation. In Section IV we
present and discuss the results of a relevant case study. Finally,
Section V concludes the paper.
II. WIND POWER PRODUCER AS A PRICE-MAKER UNDER
UNCERTAINTY
In this section we provide the general framework upon
which we build a bilevel model accounting for the Stack-
elberg relationship between wind power producers (leaders)
and market operators (followers). First, we model stochastic
production and then proceed to introduce a set of basic
assumptions consistent with literature on this topic.
We consider that a wind power producer faces an upper limit
P capw in its output defined by the technical specifications of the
deployed wind turbines w and that the real-time generation
is equal to yP capw , where y ∈ [0, 1] is the realization of
the random variable Y which models wind power stochastic
output. In consistence with stochastic programming literature,
the electricity production from a stochastic producer can be
modelled by a finite set K of scenarios sampled from the
aforementioned random variable. The predicted wind power
realization for scenario k ∈ K is denoted by P ∗wk.
Now, regarding the set of assumptions, the proposed setup
does not consider network constraints. This is consistent
with the zonal pricing scheme of the European electricity
markets, e.g., NordPool. We only take into account wind power
uncertainty during real-time operation. However, note that the
model can be extended including network representation and
other sources of uncertainty. In the absence of inter-temporal
coupling constraints between the trading periods, e.g., ramping
limits, we focus on a single time period, while social welfare
maximization is equivalent to cost minimization given the
assumption of completely inelastic demand.
Finally, we consider that only a single wind power producer
may exhibit strategic behaviour, while the rest of market par-
ticipants are perfectly competitive, i.e, offer their full capacity
at marginal cost. This is a relevant assumption in regions where
a few stakeholders operate the majority of wind power plants.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the extension to multiple
price-maker wind power producers can be formulated as a
stochastic Equilibrium Program with Equilibrium Constraints
(EPEC) modelling the multiple-leader-follower problem. This
topic is left for future research. Moreover, in the absence
of fuel costs, the selling offer price of wind power is set
equal to zero and thus the only strategic decision parameter
of the producer is the overall capacity offered in the day-
ahead market, while the probabilistic information about its
production is centrally obtained. Future work could focus on
these forecasts being additional strategic components for wind
power producers.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
In Section III-A we formulate the bilevel optimization
problem which determines the wind power producer’s optimal
offer. In Section III-B the bilevel problem is transformed
into a single-level Mathematical Program with Equilibrium
Constraints (MPEC), which is then turned into a Mixed-Integer
Linear Program (MILP) in Section III-C.
A. Bilevel model
A strategic producer owing w wind farms derives the opti-
mal bidding quantity employing the following bilevel model:
Max.
pbidw
λDA
∑
w∈W
pw+
∑
k∈K
[
λBk
∑
w∈W
(P ∗wk − pw − pspillwk )
]
(1a)
pbidw ≤ P capw , ∀w (1b)
subject to
pw, p
spill
wk , λ
DA, λBk ∈ arg
{
Min.
Ξ
∑
i∈I
Cipi + Ek
[∑
i∈I
(C+i r
+
ik − C−i r−ik) + Cshlshk
]
(2a)
subject to∑
w∈W
pw +
∑
i∈I
pi = D : λ
DA (2b)
pi ≤ Pmaxi : µPi , ∀i (2c)
Pmini ≤ pi : µPi , ∀i (2d)
pw ≤ pbidw : ρPw, ∀w (2e)
0 ≤ pw : ρPw, ∀w (2f)∑
i∈I
(r+ik − r−ik) + lshk
+
∑
w∈W
(P ∗wk − pw − pspillwk ) = 0 : λBk , ∀k (2g)
pi + r
+
ik ≤ Pmaxi : µPRik , ∀i,∀k (2h)
pi − r−ik ≥ Pmini : µPRik , ∀i,∀k (2i)
r+ik ≤ R+i : µR
+
ik , ∀i,∀k (2j)
r−ik ≤ R−i : µR
−
ik , ∀i,∀k (2k)
r+ik, r
−
ik ≥ 0 : (µR
+
ik
, µR
−
ik
), ∀i,∀k (2l)
lshk ≤ D : µshk , ∀k (2m)
pspillwk ≤ P ∗wk : µspillwk , ∀w,∀k (2n)
0 ≤ pspillwk , lshk : (µspillwk , µshk ), ∀w,∀k
}
(2o)
where Ek[·] is the expectation operator, defined as the
sum over a finite set of scenarios K weighted by the
probability of occurrence pik. The dual variable of each
constraint is indicated after a colon. The set of optimization
variables of the lower level problem is defined as Ξ ={
pw, pi, r
+
ik, r
−
ik, l
sh
k , p
spill
wk , λ
DA, µPi , µ
P
i
, ρPw, ρ
P
w
, λBk , µ
PR
ik , µ
PR
ik
,
µR
+
ik , µ
R+
ik
, µR
−
ik , µ
R−
ik
, µshk , µ
sh
k
, µspillwk , µ
spill
wk
, ∀i, w, k}.
The objective function (1a) of the upper level problem
maximizes the expected profit of the wind power producer
and consists of two terms:
1) The term λDApw represents the revenue of each wind
farm w in the day-ahead market, calculated as the
product of the day-ahead market price λDA times the
scheduled wind power pw.
2) The term λBk(P
∗
wk−pw−pspillwk ) represents the cost/profit
in scenario k for wind farm w participating in the
balancing market to settle its deviation from the day-
ahead schedule. Positive deviations (excess generation)
are paid at a price λBk , while negative deviations (gener-
ation shortage) are charged at a price λBk .
Note that λBk are probability weighted balancing market prices,
i.e., if a specific scenario k realizes the corresponding real-time
price will be equal to λBk/pik. Constraint (1b) indicates that
the wind power production offered in the day-ahead market is
limited by the installed capacity P capw .
The lower level problem represents the joint clearing of
day-ahead and real-time markets, where the objective function
(2a) minimizes the expected system cost. Equality constraints
(2b) and (2g) guarantee the power balance between produc-
tion and consumption in day-ahead and real-time operation,
respectively. Constraints (2c)-(2f) impose the capacity limits
of conventional and wind power units in the forward market-
clearing. Moreover, the set of constraints (2h)-(2l) model the
power and reserve capacity limits during real-time operation.
Finally, the upper and lower bounds of load shedding and wind
spillage are enforced by constraints (2m)-(2o).
B. MPEC
Considering that the hierarchical relationship between the
two optimization problems cannot be handled directly by avail-
able optimization solvers, the bilevel problem is transformed
into a single-level problem. Taking into account that the lower
level problem (2a)-(2o) is linear, it can be replaced by its KKT
conditions [8] as follows
Max.
Ξ†
λDA
∑
w∈W
pw+
∑
k∈K
[
λBk
∑
w∈W
(P ∗wk − pw − pspillwk )
]
(3a)
subject to
constraints (2b)-(2o) (3b)
Ci − λDA + µPi − µPi +
∑
k∈K
(µPRik − µPRik ) = 0, ∀i (3c)
− λDA + ρPw − ρPw +
∑
k∈K
λBk = 0, ∀w (3d)
pikC
+
i − λBk + µPRik + µR
+
ik − µR
+
ik
= 0, ∀i,∀k (3e)
− pikC−i + λBk + µPRik + µR
−
ik − µR
−
ik
= 0, ∀i,∀k (3f)
pikC
sh − λBk + µshk − µshk = 0, ∀k (3g)
λBk + µ
spill
wk − µspillwk = 0, ∀w,∀k (3h)
0 ≤ µPi ⊥ Pmaxi − pi ≥ 0, ∀i (3i)
0 ≤ µP
i
⊥ pi − Pmini ≥ 0, ∀i (3j)
0 ≤ ρPw ⊥ pbidw − pw ≥ 0, ∀w (3k)
0 ≤ ρP
w
⊥ pw ≥ 0, ∀w (3l)
0 ≤ µPRik ⊥ Pmaxi − pi − r+ik ≥ 0, ∀i,∀k (3m)
0 ≤ µPR
ik
⊥ pi − r−ik − Pmini ≥ 0, ∀i,∀k (3n)
0 ≤ µR+ik ⊥ R+i − r+ik ≥ 0, ∀i,∀k (3o)
0 ≤ µR+
ik
⊥ r+ik ≥ 0, ∀i, ∀k (3p)
0 ≤ µR−ik ⊥ R−i − r−ik ≥ 0, ∀i,∀k (3q)
0 ≤ µR−
ik
⊥ r−ik ≥ 0, ∀i,∀k (3r)
0 ≤ µshk ⊥ D − lshk ≥ 0, ∀k (3s)
0 ≤ µsh
k
⊥ lshk ≥ 0, ∀k (3t)
0 ≤ µspillwk ⊥ P ∗wk − pspillwk ≥ 0, ∀w,∀k (3u)
0 ≤ µspill
wk
⊥ pspillwk ≥ 0, ∀w,∀k (3v)
where pbidw ∪ Ξ = Ξ† and the ⊥ operator indicates that the
product of the expressions on its right and left side is equal
to zero. Equations (3c)-(3h) are stationarity conditions while
(3i)-(3v) are complementarity slackness conditions.
C. MILP
The MPEC problem (3) described in the previous section
cannot be readily solved due to the bilinear terms λDApw and
λBkpw that appear in the objective function, and the nonlinear
complementarity constraints (3i)-(3v). These nonlinearities are
raised by the following set of transformations.
The complementarity conditions (3k), (3l) and (3u), (3v)
write as
ρPw(p
bid
w − pw) = 0⇔ ρPwpbidw = ρPwpw, ∀w (4a)
ρP
w
pw = 0, ∀w (4b)
µspillwk (P
∗
wk − pspillwk )⇔ µspillwk P ∗wk = µspillwk pspillwk , ∀w,∀k (4c)
µspill
wk
pspillwk = 0, ∀w,∀k (4d)
Constraint (3d) can be reformulated as
λDA −
∑
k∈K
λBk = ρ
P
w − ρPw, ∀w (4e)
while constraint (3h) can be written as
µspillwk − µspillwk = −λBk , ∀w, k (4f)
Multiplying equation (4f) by pspillwk , we obtain
µspillwk p
spill
wk − µspillwk p
spill
wk = −λBkpspillwk , ∀w, k (4g)
Then, the objective function (3a) can be reformulated as
λDA
∑
w∈W
pw +
∑
k∈K
[
λBk
∑
w∈W
(P ∗wk − pw − pspillwk )
]
=
∑
w∈W
pw
[
λDA −
∑
k∈K
λBk
]
+
∑
k∈K
λBk
∑
w∈W
(P ∗wk − pspillwk )
(4e)
=
(4g)∑
w∈W
pw(ρ
P
w − ρPw) +
∑
k∈K
λBk
∑
w∈W
P ∗wk
+
∑
k∈K
∑
w∈W
(µspillwk p
spill
wk − µspillwk p
spill
wk )
(4b)
=
(4d)∑
w∈W
pwρ
P
w +
∑
k∈K
λBk
∑
w∈W
P ∗wk +
∑
k∈K
∑
w∈W
µspillwk p
spill
wk
(4a)
=
(4c)∑
w∈W
pbidw ρ
P
w +
∑
k∈K
λBk
∑
w∈W
P ∗wk +
∑
k∈K
∑
w∈W
µspillwk P
∗
wk (4h)
The final expression of (4h) still involves the nonlinear term
pbidw ρ
P
w. However, assuming that the bidding quantity p
bid
w can
be discretized in NJ equal blocks as
pbidw =
∑
j∈J
vwj pˆw (4i)
P capw = N
J pˆw (4j)
where vwj is a binary variable and pˆw is the block size, e.g.,
1 MW, the term pbidw ρ
P
w can be written as
pbidw ρ
P
w = ρ
P
w
∑
j∈J
vwj pˆw = pˆw
∑
j∈J
vwjρ
P
w (4k)
The term zwj = vwjρPw is a product of binary vwj and contin-
uous variable ρPw ∈
[
ρPw,min, ρ
P
w,max
]
, where ρPw,min, ρ
P
w,max are
constants. This product can be linearised [9] as
ρPw,minvwj ≤ zwj ≤ ρPw,maxvwj (4la)
ρPw − ρPw,max(1− vwj) ≤ zwj ≤ ρPw − ρPw,min(1− vwj) (4lb)
Hence, the objective function (4h) is now written as
Max.
Ξ†∪Ξ‡
∑
w∈W
pˆw
∑
j∈J
zwj +
∑
k∈K
∑
w∈W
(λBk + µ
spill
wk )P
∗
wk (4m)
where Ξ‡ contains the auxiliary variables needed to apply
transformations (4la)-(4lb) and to reformulate complementar-
ity relationships (3i)-(3v) via disjunctive constraints [10].
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section we evaluate the proposed model using a
power system based on a modified version of the IEEE
Reliability Test System presented in [11]. We adapted the
power system to fit our specific assumptions, most notably
the lack of network structure and the existence of a single
wind power producer. The conventional generators with the
same power output capacity and offer costs were merged and
the total capacity of the system was scaled down by a factor
of five. Table I presents the data for the conventional units.
Up and down regulating costs set equal to 1.1 and 0.91 of
the energy offer price, respectively. The total system demand
is equal to 450 MW. Wind power production uncertainty is
modelled using a Beta distribution B(α, β) in consistence with
relevant literature [12]. Wind power uncertainty is described
using a set of 50 equiprobable scenarios sampled from a Beta
distribution with parameters α = 2.1725 and β = 1.7775. The
TABLE I
CONVENTIONAL UNIT DATA
Unit G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8
Ci 15.97 22.72 22.13 30.4 5.66 0 11.26 11.72
Pmaxi 60.8 60 118.2 12 160 60 124 70
C+i 0 0 24.34 33.44 0 0 0 0
C−i 0 0 20.13 27.66 0 0 0 0
R+i 0 0 71.49 7.26 0 0 0 0
R−i 0 0 71.49 7.26 0 0 0 0
spilling action is considered cost free, whereas Csh is equal to
200 $/MWh and Pmini is set to zero for all units.
Fig. 1 compares the evolution of the expected profit as a
function of wind power penetration for a strategic versus a
non-strategic wind power producer. In the current context, a
non-strategic producer offers all its capacity P capw in the day-
ahead market. The general trend of these curves indicates
that larger volumes of wind power generation lead to higher
expected profits. However, moving from 10% to 15% wind
penetration results into a moderate decrease of the expected
profits due to the market dynamics. In that case, the higher
wind power in-feed changes the marginal unit of the system
and consequently entails a day-ahead price reduction which
cannot be compensated by the larger traded quantity. For
penetration levels up to 25%, both trading strategies achieve
identical profits suggesting that the wind power producer is not
able to improve its position by hedging the forecast uncertainty
between the day-ahead and real-time markets. On the contrary,
for shares greater than 30%, wind power becomes a price-
maker and thus its bidding strategy can influence the market-
clearing and enhance its economic performance.
In the current case study where any real-time imbalances
depend solely on the deviations of the single producer from
the day-ahead schedule, the optimal bid is driven by the cost
of re-dispatching actions. Considering that all wind power
deviations, irrespective of sign, are penalized in real-time
market, i.e., production surplus (deficit) is sold (charged)
in lower (higher) price than the forward price, the strategic
producer aims to protect himself against extreme imbalance
costs. Hence, it is relevant to take into account the non-
symmetric regulation unit costs of this market setup, i.e.,
the positive/negative price premium from the day-ahead price
for up/down regulation. To better understand this concept,
one may consider the difference in cost between the most
expensive up and down re-dispatching actions; namely load
shedding and wind spillage, respectively. Hence, the strategic
producer will aim primarily to reduce its exposure to extreme
up-regulation costs by taking a long position (pbidw < P
∗
wk)
as wind penetration increases. This justifies the fact that
the strategic offering achieves higher profitability for larger
shares of wind, where the probability of the system resorting
to expensive re-dispatching actions is higher. Nonetheless,
improving the expected profit of a strategic producer does not
translate to a proportional system cost increase. For example,
at penetration levels ranging from 40% to 50%, the strategic
producer achieves more than 7% higher expected profit, while
the corresponding system cost raises less than 1%.
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Fig. 1. Expected profit of wind power producer as a function of wind power
penetration.
Following the preceding analysis, we study the effect of
available flexible capacity, i.e., generation providing balancing
services, to the profit of the wind power producer for a pene-
tration level of 35%. Fig. 2 demonstrates the positive impact
of system flexibility on the profitability of wind. This can be
explained considering that higher flexibility translates into a
less penalizing balancing market in a sense that it reduces
the need for very expensive re-dispatching actions in extreme
wind scenarios. Nevertheless, for flexible capacity greater than
22.5% we notice a saturation of the expected profit, while
the corresponding curves for both offering strategies coincide.
This is an indication of an efficient market managing to align
the interests of the system operator and the strategic producer,
since the latter has no incentive to deviate from the day-ahead
dispatch that minimizes system cost.
The optimal offering problem has been solved using CPLEX
12.6 under GAMS. The average computation time of each
problem was 20 seconds on a stationary computer with Intel
i7 4-core processor clocking at 3.4 GHz and 8 GB of RAM.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper considers the trading strategy of a wind power
producer participating in a co-optimized day-ahead and real-
time market-clearing. The hierarchical relationship between
the decisions of a price-maker producer and the market out-
come is modelled as an MPEC and reformulated as an MILP.
Our case study shows that in view of its uncertainty risk
and the potential recourse actions, a strategic producer with
dominant market position may improve its expected profits by
adjusting its day-ahead quantity offer. However, this behaviour
can be offset by increasing the flexible capacity of the system.
For future research we intend to include network structure
and gradually relax the assumptions related to the number
of wind power producers in the system. This will allow to
access the market value and the strategic positioning of a price-
maker producer not only with respect to its size but also to
its correlation with the aggregate wind power production in
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Fig. 2. Expected profit of wind power producer as a function of flexible
capacity ranging from 2.5% to 27.5% for 35% wind power penetration.
the system. This setup can be further extended by introducing
competition among multiple strategic producers following an
EPEC approach to determine the market equilibrium.
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